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Randomization can be employed to achieve constant factor approximations to the coalition
structure generation problem in less time than all previous approximation algorithms. In
particular, this manuscript presents a new randomized algorithm that can generate a 23
approximate solution in O (
√
n2.587n) time, improving upon the previous algorithm that
required O (
√
n2.83n) time to guarantee the same performance. Also, the presented new
techniques allow a 14 approximate solution to be generated in the optimal time of O (2
n)
and improves on the previous best approximation ratio obtainable in O (2n) time of 18 .
The presented algorithms are based upon a careful analysis of the sizes and numbers of
coalitions in the smallest optimal coalition structures.
An empirical analysis of the new randomized algorithms compared to their deterministic
counterparts is provided. We ﬁnd that the presented randomized algorithms generate
solutions with utility comparable to what is returned by their deterministic counterparts
(in some cases producing better results on average). Moreover, a signiﬁcant speedup was
found for most approximation ratios for the randomized algorithms over the deterministic
algorithms. In particular, the randomized 12 approximate algorithm runs in approximately
22.4% of the time required for the deterministic 12 approximation algorithm for problems
with between 20 and 27 agents.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many situations require partitioning the agents into disjoint teams or coalitions where each coalition cooperatively com-
pletes a subgoal or subtask [1–3]. However, the process of optimally partitioning the agents into coalitions is computationally
diﬃcult due to the fact that the number of potential coalitions scales exponentially with the number of agents.
Characteristic function games, a class of cooperative games, models cooperative multi-agent situations by assigning each
coalition a value indicating the joint utility those agents will receive if they form a coalition [1,2,4–7]. For example, this
utility may be the difference between the utility earned by completing the subtask assigned to the potential coalition and
the estimated cost incurred during task execution. Given a set of agents, N , a characteristic function game is deﬁned by a
function ν : N → R0. The value ν(C), for a coalition C ⊆ N , is the joint utility the members of C will receive if C forms.
A coalition structure is simply a partitioning of the agents into disjoint coalitions. The coalition structure generation problem
(CSG problem) is to construct a coalition structure C S that maximizes:
ν(C S) =
∑
C∈C S
ν(C).
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O (3n) time [2,8]. Due to the high computational complexity of the optimal CSG algorithm, much research has focused on
the development of anytime algorithms. While these anytime algorithms can quickly return approximate solutions, in the
worst case most current anytime algorithms require O (nn) time to determine the optimal solution, far worse than the O (3n)
time dynamic programming algorithm. Among the current state-of-the-art is Rahwan et al’s. [1] Integer Partition algorithm.
Due to the high computational complexity of constructing the optimal coalition structure, our recent work has focused
on developing approximation algorithms that return solutions with bounds on their quality in time less than O (3n) [9,10].
For example, our prior algorithm was capable of returning a solution that was at least 23 of the optimal in O (
√
n2.83n) time.
This paper improves upon the state-of-the-art in CSG approximation algorithms by presenting randomized algorithms
that achieve the same approximation ratios as our prior work, but require signiﬁcantly less time. For example, our new
randomized approximation algorithm is capable of generating a 23 approximation in O (
√
n2.59n) time. This result improves
upon our previous O (
√
n2.83n) time deterministic algorithm for the same approximation ratio. We also show how to gen-
erate a 14 approximation in the optimal time of O (2
n) (i.e., any algorithm must observe the values of all 2n − 1 coalitions in
order to guarantee any approximate solution [2]).
Our methods also permit approximation ratios that are unachievable by current approximation algorithms. For example,
our randomized algorithm is the ﬁrst designed to guarantee a 35 approximation ratio.
All of the presented approximation algorithms are probabilistic in the sense that they are guaranteed to return their
stated approximation ratio with high probability. Iteratively running the algorithms a small number of times and simply
taking the highest quality solution yields the stated approximation ratio with high probability. For example, if a given
algorithm ﬁnds a 23 approximation ratio with probability at least
1
2 , then running the algorithm k times and taking the best
result yields a 23 approximation with probability 1− ( 12 )k . Several of the presented algorithmic results are of the form:
Algorithm A returns a coalition structure that is guaranteed to have value within a factor of f of the optimal with
probability greater than 12 . A runs in expected time O (g(n)).
That is, the output of the algorithm (and hence the quality of the solution it presents) is a random variable, and for some
of the presented algorithms, the runtime of the algorithm is also a random variable.
An empirical study is presented that shows the randomized algorithms perform similarly to their deterministic coun-
terparts in terms of utility and sometimes ﬁnd higher quality solutions. Further, it is shown that the run time of the
randomized algorithms, for most approximation guarantees, is signiﬁcantly faster than the deterministic algorithms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the prior work on coalition structure genera-
tion. Section 3 presents the new randomized algorithms for coalition structure generation. Section 4 provides an empirical
comparison of the new randomized algorithms to their deterministic counterparts. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2. Related work
Much algorithm research has focused on the coalition structure generation problem. The current fastest algorithm that is
guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal solution is based on dynamic programming and requires O (3n) time to ﬁnd an optimal coali-
tion structure on n agents [7,2,8]. Given this high computational complexity, recent work has focused on the development
of anytime and approximation algorithms.
Sandholm et al. [2] developed one of the ﬁrst anytime algorithms for the coalition structure generation problem. Sand-
holm et al. viewed coalition structure generation as a search through the lattice of partitions of the n agents, which they
referred to as the coalition structure graph. Sandholm et al.’s algorithm proceeded by searching through the bottom two
levels of the coalition structure graph (i.e., those coalition structures that consisted of only one or two coalitions), followed
by a breadth ﬁrst search from the top of the graph (i.e., examining those coalition structures that consist of i coalitions
followed by those coalition structures that consist of i − 1 coalitions and so on). Sandholm et al. derive guarantees on the
quality of the best solution found so far based upon which levels of the coalition structure graph have been searched.
Among the state-of-the-art in anytime coalition structure generation is Rahwan et al.’s [1,6] Integer Partition algorithm.
As with Sandholm et al.’s algorithm, the Integer Partition algorithm searches directly through the space of coalition struc-
tures. The Integer Partition algorithm groups coalition structures together into subspaces based upon the sizes of the
coalitions they contain. For example, both the coalition structures {{1,2}, {3}, {4}} and {{3,4}, {1}, {2}} are in the same
subspace as they both contain a coalition of size 2 and two coalitions of size 1. Rahwan et al. show how to generate upper
and lower bounds on the quality of the coalition structures in each subspace. The Integer Partition algorithm uses those
bounds to perform a branch and bound search through the space of all coalition structures. Empirically, Rahwan et al. have
shown that the Integer Partition algorithm is often capable of quickly pruning many of the subspaces from consideration
and performs signiﬁcantly better than Sandholm et al.’s algorithm.
While the Integer Partition algorithm performs well empirically on many problem distributions, it is possible to construct
distributions on which the Integer Partition algorithms performance deteriorates signiﬁcantly [10]. The worst case runtime
required to ﬁnd the optimal solution of both the Integer Partition algorithm and Sandholm et al.’s algorithm is O (nn), since
in the worst case each coalition structure must be examined and there are O (nn) coalition structures.
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Our recent work has focused on developing approximation algorithms for coalition structure generation that are guar-
anteed to ﬁnd an approximate solution of a given quality in less than O (3n) time [9,10]. For example, we have shown
that it is possible to ﬁnd an approximate solution with value at least 23 of the optimal in O (
√
n2.83n) time. All current
approximation algorithms are deterministic, in that they always return the same answer in the same amount of time when
run on the same problem instance. The currently reported research expands upon the state-of-the-art by showing how to
employ randomization to generate approximate solutions with the same quality guarantees in less time than the current
deterministic techniques.
The presented randomized approximation algorithms all relying on a deterministic preprocessing phase. This preprocess-
ing phase formed the basis for previous approximation algorithms.
The following deﬁnitions will be used:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A characteristic function ν is monotonic iff whenever C ⊆ S ⊆ N , then ν(C) ν(S).
Intuitively, a characteristic function is monotonic if adding an agent to a coalition can never harm the coalition members.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A characteristic function ν is k-superadditive iff for all C, S ⊆ N such that
1. C ∩ S = ∅ and
2. |C ∪ S| k,
then ν(C) + ν(S) ν(C ∪ S).
If ν is n-superadditive (or just superadditive), then the merger of any two coalitions into a larger coalition is never harm-
ful. If C S∗ = {C1, . . . ,Ck} with k 2 is an optimal coalition structure in a superadditive game, then C S∗2 = {C1, . . . ,Ck−1∪Ck}
will be optimal as well. This means that in a superadditive game, the coalition structure that places every agent into the
same coalition (referred to as the grand coalition) is optimal.
Superadditivity is a natural assumption. If two coalitions C1 and C2 merge, in the worst case, the members of C1 ∪ C2
behave as if the merger did not occur and receive value ν(C1)+ν(C2). However, larger coalitions often times incur additional
overhead (e.g., communication and/or computational overhead) [11]. It may be that the merger of coalitions is beneﬁcial up
to a point. That is, there is a point at which coordination costs outweigh the potential beneﬁt derived from a larger coalition.
The notion of k-superadditivity models such situations. For example, a game ν may be k-superadditive, because even though
C1 ∪ C2 can earn strictly more utility than C1 and C2 independently, the cost of coordinating the actions of members of
C1 ∪ C2 outweighs the additional utility when |C1 ∪ C2| > k. Our previous work showed that, as with superadditive games,
the existence of optimal coalition structures with only a few coalitions in k-superadditive games can be guaranteed [9].
Theorem 2.3. Let r  n be a positive integer. If ν is nr -superadditive, then ν has an optimal solution that consists of at most 2r − 1
coalitions. If ν is 2n2r−1 -superadditive, then ν has an optimal solution consisting of 2r − 2 coalitions.
The reader is directed to the prior paper [9] for the formal proof of Theorem 2.3; however, the intuition is as follows: Let
ν be k-superadditive and C S∗ an optimal coalition structure in ν that has the smallest number of coalitions. If C S∗ contains
two coalitions, C1 and C2, each of which contains no more than k2 coalitions, then, as ν is k-superadditive, ν(C1 ∪ C2) 
ν(C1) + ν(C2). However, a new optimal coalition structure with fewer coalitions can be constructed by replacing C1 and C2
in C S∗ with C1 ∪ C2, but this is a contradiction. Hence, at most one coalition in C S∗ has no more than k2 coalitions. Less
formally, C S∗ can have at most one small coalition (coalition with no more than k2 agents). Therefore, most coalitions in
C S∗ must be large and there cannot be too many of them.
Our prior work showed how to construct a new game ν k
r
from any characteristic function game ν such that:
1. ν k
r
is knr superadditive and monotonic,
2. optimal solutions to ν and ν k
r
have the same value, and
3. given an approximate solution to ν k
r
, a solution of equal or greater value can be constructed in ν in polynomial time.
Pseudo-code for the construction of a monotonic ν k
r
is broken up into two steps [9]. The ﬁrst step, shown in Algo-
rithm 2.1, takes an arbitrary coalitional game ν and constructs a new game ν k
r
that is knr -superadditive, but not necessarily
monotonic. The second step, shown in Algorithm 2.2, uses the newly constructed ν k
r
to construct a new game νmax that is
both kn -superadditive and monotonic.r
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r
.
1: for i = 1 to 
 knr  do
2: for C ⊆ N , |C | = i do
3: ν k
r
(C) ← ν(C)
4: for C ′ ⊂ C do
5: if ν k
r
(C ′) + ν k
r
(C \ C ′) > ν k
r
(C) then
6: ν k
r
(C) ← ν k
r
(C ′) + ν k
r
(C \ C ′)
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
11: ν k
r
(C) = ν(C) for all C such that |C | > knr
Algorithm 2.1 constructs a knr -superadditive game by considering the merger of every pair of disjoint coalitions, C and S ,
with |C ∪ S| knr in order of increasing size. For each coalition |C | k, the best value over all possible splittings of C into
two disjoint coalitions is stored in ν k
r
(C). By proceeding in order of increasing size, this results in ν k
r
(C) equalling the value
of the optimal coalition structure over the agents in C . For coalitions, C with more than k agents, ν k
r
(C) is set equal to ν(C).
In addition to storing the value of each coalition, the optimal way in which to split a coalition C into two smaller coalitions
S,C \ S is stored as well. Given a coalition structure in ν k
r
, a coalition of equal value can be constructed in ν by following
the splittings of coalitions.
Algorithm 2.2 Constructing νmax .
1: for k = 1 to n do
2: for C ⊆ N , |C | = k do
3: νmax(C) ← ν k
r
(C)
4: for a ∈ C do
5: if νmax(C − {a}) > νmax(C) then
6: νmax(C) ← νmax(C \ {a})
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
Algorithm 2.2 constructs a monotonic game by setting for each C ⊆ N νmax(C) = maxS⊆C ν k
r
(S). Naively building νmax
requires taking the maximum over 2|C | values for each coalition C . Algorithm 2.2 constructs νmax more eﬃciently by con-
sidering coalitions in order of increasing size. When considering a coalition C , we have that νmax(S) = maxS ′⊆S ν k
r
(S ′) for
all S  C . Thus, determining maxS⊆C ν k
r
(S) requires taking the maximum over |C | + 1 values ν k
r
(C) and ν k
r
(C \ a) for each
a ∈ |C |. This total process requires O (n2n) time.
Notice that if it is known that ν has an optimal solution, C S∗ that consists of k solutions, then the coalition C =
argmaxC⊂N ν(C) has value at least ν(C S
∗)
k . This result is true since C has value at least as great as all coalitions in C S
∗ .
Likewise if C1, . . . ,Cm are m k disjoint, possibly empty coalitions that maximize ν(C1) + · · · + ν(Cm) over all disjoint sets
of m, possible empty coalitions, then ν(C1) + · · · + ν(Cm) mk ν(C S∗). Given such a set of m coalitions, a coalition structure
in the original game ν that has value at least mk ν(C S
∗) can be constructed in polynomial time [9]. Algorithms that ﬁnd such
a collection of m coalitions will be referred to as solution extraction procedures.
Previous deterministic approximation algorithms worked by constructing ν k
r
from ν and extracting two disjoint and
possibly empty coalitions, C1 and C2, that maximized ν k
r
(C1) + ν k
r
(C2). Since ν k
r
is monotonic, ﬁnding two such coalitions
can be accomplished by taking the maximum of ν(C)+ ν(N \ C) over all C ⊆ N in O (2n) time. This technique yields a 22r−1
approximate solution when ν 1
r
is constructed from ν and a 1r−1 approximation solution when ν 22r−1 is constructed.
3. Randomized coalition structure generation
This section presents a randomized algorithm for approximate coalition structure generation. The presented techniques
signiﬁcantly improve upon the runtimes of their deterministic counterparts.
The algorithms presented all succeed in ﬁnding an f -approximate solution with probability greater than e−1e . Rerunning
the algorithm, for example, three times and selecting the best solution found over all three runs, results in an f -approximate
solution with probability at least 1− (1− e−1e )3 > 0.95 (i.e., the probability that all three runs fail to ﬁnd an f -approximate
solution is no more than (1− e−1e )3). However, the performance of the algorithm may not be the only probabilistic element.
The algorithm’s runtime may also be a random variable. When an algorithm’s runtime is a random variable, we report the
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high probability.
All of the presented results follow from a careful analysis of the number of coalitions, and their respective sizes, for
a particular optimal solution. As a result, a single randomized approximate algorithm that is capable of generating all the
approximation ratios is not presented. Instead, it is necessary to tailor each algorithm to each approximation ratio. Therefore,
a different algorithm for each approximation ratio is presented.
Many of the presented algorithms involve examining all coalitions of agents that contain at most some ﬁxed fraction of
the agents (i.e., all coalitions that consist of at most 
nr  agents). The ﬂoor symbols are dropped from the statement of the
algorithms and their correctness proofs in order to improve readability. For example,
( n
n
r
)
is written even though nr may not
be an integer. The ﬂoor of nr is implicitly taken in these situations. Removal of the ﬂoor symbols affects only the readability
of the formula and not the derived asymptotic bounds.
All the presented randomized approximation algorithms are based on the following underlying idea. Given an arbitrary
coalitional game ν , ﬁrst construct ν k
r
, for appropriately chosen k and r. Second, extract m disjoint coalitions that maximize
their combined value. It has been previously shown how this can be accomplished in O (n2n) time for m = 1,2. The main
contribution of this work is to show that in some situations, extracting m disjoint, possible empty coalitions that maximize
the sum of their values for m = 3,4 is possible using simple randomized algorithms.
In summary, the presented randomized approximation techniques are variations of the following procedure:
1. Construct ν k
r
to ensure that there exists an optimal coalition structure that contains only m coalitions (for some con-
stant m).
2. Run, possibly multiple solution extraction procedures and return the best solution.
Multiple solution extraction procedures are required because the smallest optimal solution may contain 1, . . . ,m coalitions.
Each extraction procedure is designed to handle some subset of the possible sizes of the smallest optimal solution.
Constructing ν k
r
requires O (
√
nrn2
kn
r
k
kn
r (r−k) (r−k)nr
) time [9]. All but one of the presented algorithms will require ν k
r
to be mono-
tonic. Enforcing the constraint that ν k
r
is monotonic requires an additional O (n2n) time [9]. Unless otherwise stated, we
assume that ν k
r
is monotonic.
Algorithm 3.1 represents the ﬁrst solution extraction procedure to extract two disjoint coalitions C1 and C2 that maxi-
mize ν k
r
(C1) + ν k
r
(C2).
Algorithm 3.1 Extracting two coalitions from a monotonic ν .
1: C1 = N
2: C2 = ∅
3: for C ⊆ N do
4: if νmax(C) + νmax(N \ C) > νmax(C1) + νmax(C2) then
5: C1 = C
6: C2 = N \ C
7: end if
8: end for
The second and third extraction procedures (Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3) are randomized and require a priori knowledge of
the maximum sizes of the coalitions to be extracted.
Algorithm 3.2 works as follows: Assume that it is known there are three disjoint coalitions C∗1 , C∗2 and C∗3 with total
value at least f times that of an optimal solution. A simple randomized approach to ﬁnd three disjoint coalitions with total
value at least f times that of the optimal simply adds each agent to one of three sets with equal probability. That is, with
probability 13 each agent ai is added to coalition C1, with probability
1
3 ai is added to C2, and with probability
1
3 to C3.
Since νmax is monotonic, as long as C∗i ⊆ Ci for i = 1,2,3, then the total value of C1, C2 and C3 will be at least f times that
of an optimal solution. The probability that C∗i ⊆ Ci for i = 1,2, and 3 is simply ( 13 )|C
∗
1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 | . Lemma 3.1 shows that in
order to be guaranteed to ﬁnd C1, C2 and C3 with high probability, it is necessary to repeat this procedure O (3|C
∗
1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 |)
times.
Lemma 3.1. In a binomial distribution with success probability p after  1p  trials, the probability of at least one success is at least e−1e
(approximately, 63.21%).
Please see Appendix A for the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 provides a proof of the correctness and runtime of Algorithm 3.2.
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1: C1 ← ∅
2: C2 ← ∅
3: C3 ← ∅
4: for i = 0 to num_iterations do
5: C ′1 ← ∅
6: C ′2 ← ∅
7: C ′3 ← ∅
8: for k = 0 to num_agents do
9: Add agent ak to one of the coalitions C ′1,C ′2 or C ′3 with equal probability.
10: end for
11: if ν(C ′1) + ν(C ′2) + ν(C ′3) > ν(C1) + ν(C2) + ν(C3) then
12: C1 ← C ′1
13: C2 ← C ′2
14: C3 ← C ′3
15: end if
16: end for
Algorithm 3.3 Extracting four coalitions from a monotonic ν . Requires two parameters: num_iterations and upperbound.
1: Ci ← ∅ for i = 1,2,3,4
2: for i = 0 to num_iterations do
3: C ′i ← ∅ for i = 1,2,3,4
4: for k = 0 to num_agents do
5: Add agent ak to one of S1 and S2 with equal probability
6: end for
7: for A ⊂ S1, |A| upperbound do
8: if ν(A) + ν(S1 \ A) > ν(C1) + ν(C3) then
9: C ′1 ← S1 \ A
10: C ′3 ← A
11: end if
12: end for
13: for A ⊂ S2, |A| upperbound do
14: if ν(A) + ν(S2 \ A) > ν(C2) + ν(C4) then
15: C ′2 ← S2 \ A
16: C ′4 ← A
17: end if
18: end for
19: if ν(C ′1) + ν(C ′2) + ν(C ′3) + ν(C ′4) > ν(C1) + ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) then
20: Ci ← C ′i for i = 1,2,3,4
21: end if
22: end for
Lemma 3.2. Let C∗1 , C∗2 and C∗3 be three disjoint coalitions from a set of n agents. If ν is monotonic, then after O (3
|C∗1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 |)
iterations the best solution found by Algorithm 3.2 has value at least ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗3) with probability at least e−1e .
Proof. During a single iteration of Algorithm 3.2, the probability that all agents in C∗i are placed in C
′
i , for i = 1,2, and 3, is
simply ( 13 )
|C∗1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 | . The iterations of Algorithm 3.2 form a binomial distribution with success probability ( 13 )
|C∗1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 | .
Therefore, after 3|C∗1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 | iterations, with probability greater than e−1e , Algorithm 3.2 succeeds in ﬁnding three coalitions
C ′1 ⊆ C∗1 , C ′2 ⊆ C∗2 and C ′3 ⊆ C∗3 . Since ν is monotonic, ν(C ′1) + ν(C ′2) + ν(C ′3) ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗3). 
The following variation of Algorithm 3.2 (henceforth referred to as Algorithm 3.2(a)) was found to be more eﬃcient in
practice. Rather then place each agent in C ′1, C ′2 or C ′3 with equal probability, each agent ai is placed in C ′1 with probability
0.375 and in C ′2 and C ′3 with probability 0.3125. The increased eﬃciency stems from the fact that the probabilities 0.375
and 0.3125 can be created easily from a fair coin, while generating an event with 13 probability cannot. All of our empirical
results employ Algorithm 3.2(a). The use of Algorithm 3.2(a) does not affect the presented asymptotic results. Lemma 3.3
shows that the required number of iterations increase only slightly under in Algorithm 3.2(a).
Lemma 3.3. Let C∗1 , C∗2 and C∗3 be three disjoint coalitions from a set of n agents. If ν is monotonic, then after O (3.012
|C∗1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 |)
iterations the best solution found by Algorithm 3.2(a) has value at least ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗3) with probability at least e−1e .
Proof. During a single iteration of Algorithm 3.2(a), the probability that all agents in C∗i are placed in C
′
i , for i = 1,2,
and 3, is simply 0.375|C∗1 | · 0.3125|C∗2 |+|C∗3 | . The iterations of Algorithm 3.2(a) form a binomial distribution with success
probability 0.375|C∗1 | · 0.3125|C∗2 |+|C∗3 | . Therefore, after ( 10.375 )|C
∗
1 | · ( 10.3125 )|C
∗
2 |+|C∗3 | iterations, with probability greater than
e−1
e , Algorithm 3.2(a) succeeds in ﬁnding three coalitions C
′
1 ⊆ C∗1 , C ′2 ⊆ C∗2 and C ′3 ⊆ C∗3 . Since ν is monotonic: ν(C ′1) +
ν(C ′ ) + ν(C ′ ) ν(C∗) + ν(C∗) + ν(C∗).2 3 1 2 3
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the total number of iterations required by the variation on Algorithm 3.2(a) is at most:
(
1
0.375
) |C1 |+|C2 |+|C3 |
3
·
(
1
0.3125
) 2(|C1 |+|C2 |+|C3 |)
3
= O (3.012(|C1|+|C2|+|C3|)). 
The fourth and ﬁnal solution extraction procedure (Algorithm 3.3) extracts four disjoint coalitions from a monotonic
game. Algorithm 3.3 works as follows: Assume that it is known that there are four disjoint coalitions C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 and C∗4
with total value at least f times that of the optimal. Without loss of generality, assume that |C∗1 |  |C∗2 |  |C∗3 |  |C∗4 |.
Algorithm 3.3 places each agent randomly in one of two sets, S1 or S2, with equal probability. After randomly distributing
the agents among S1 and S2, Algorithm 3.3 ﬁnds the two coalitions CS1 ⊂ S1 that maximizes ν(CS1 ) + ν(S1 \ CS1 ) subject
to |CS1 |  u. Notice that, since ν is monotonic, this is equivalent to ﬁnding the two coalitions C1,C2 ⊂ S1 that maximize
ν(C1) + ν(C2) subject to at least one of the coalitions containing no more than u agents. This same process is repeated for
S2. That is, the coalition CS2 ⊂ S2 that maximizes ν(CS2 ) + ν(S2 \ CS2 ) subject to |CS2 | u is found. Algorithm 3.3 returns
the maximum over all iterations of ν(CS1 ) + ν(S1 \ CS1 ) + ν(CS2 ) + ν(S2 \ CS2 ).
If C∗1,C∗3 ⊂ S1, C∗2,C∗4 ⊂ S2 and u  |C∗3 |  |C∗4 |, then ν(CS1 ) + ν(S1 \ CS1 )  ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗3) and ν(CS2 ) + ν(S2 \ CS2 ) 
ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗4). Therefore, Algorithm 3.3 will return an f approximate solution.
Determining the runtime of Algorithm 3.3 requires the following combinatorial identity, the proof of which is provided
in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.4. The following identity holds for all positive integers n > u:
n∑
k=u
(
n
k
)(
k
r
)
= 2n−u
(
n
u
)
.
Lemma 3.5 bounds the time required per iteration for Algorithm 3.3.
Lemma 3.5.With upperbound u  n3 , each iteration of Algorithm 3.3 runs in time O (
1
2u
( n
u
)
).
Proof. The probability that |S1| = k in any given iteration is
( n
k
) · 12n , as there are ( nk
)
possible sets of k agents and the
probability of S1 being any given subset of the agents is 12n .
If |S1| = k, then the for loop beginning on line 7 is executed 2k times if k  u and
( k
u
)
times if k > u. Likewise, the for
loop beginning on line 13 runs for 2n−k iterations if n − k u and ( n−k
u
)
iterations if n − k > u.
Summing over all possible sizes of S1 yields an expected runtime of:
1
2n
u∑
k=0
(
n
k
)[
2k +
(
n− k
u
)]
+ 1
2n
n−u−1∑
k=u+1
(
n
k
)[(
k
u
)
+
(
n− k
u
)]
+ 1
2n
n∑
k=n−u
(
n
k
)[(
k
u
)
+ 2n−k
]
= 1
2n
n−u−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
n− k
u
)
+ 1
2n
n∑
k=u+1
(
n
k
)(
k
u
)
+ 1
2n
u∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
2k + 1
2n
n∑
k=n−u
(
n
k
)
2n−k
= 2
2n
n∑
k=u
(
n
k
)(
k
u
)
+ 2
2n
u∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
2k  2
2n
2n−u
(
n
u
)
+ n 2
2n
2u
(
n
u
)
= O
(
1
2u
(
n
u
))
. 
Lemma 3.6. Let C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 and C∗4 be four disjoint coalitions from a set of n agents such that |C∗1 |  |C∗2 |  |C∗3 |  |C∗4 |. If ν is
monotonic, then after O (2|C∗1 |+|C∗2 |+|C∗3 |+|C∗4 |) iterations the best solution found by Algorithm 3.3 with an upperbound of at least |C∗3 |
has value at least ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗3) + ν(C∗4) with probability at least e−1e .
Proof. If during some iteration of Algorithm 3.3, C∗1,C∗3 ⊆ S1 and C∗2,C∗4 ⊆ S2, then since upperbound |C∗3 | |C∗4 | in the for
loop beginning on line 7, eventually A = C∗3 . Since ν is monotonic and C∗1 ⊂ S1 \C∗3 , then ν(S1 \C∗3)+ν(C∗3) ν(C∗1)+ν(C∗3)
and ν(C ′1) + ν(C ′3) ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗3).
Likewise, since upperbound  |C∗4 |, then ν(C ′2) + ν(C ′4)  ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗4). Therefore, Algorithm 3.3 will return a solution
with value at least ν(C∗1) + ν(C∗2) + ν(C∗3) + ν(C∗4).
By Lemma 3.1, the probability that during at least one iteration of Algorithm 3.3 C1,C3 ⊆ S1 and C2,C4 ⊆ S2 is strictly
greater than e−1 . e
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Approximation ratios and corresponding running times for the presented algorithm for arbitrary coali-
tional games. The ﬁrst column provides the approximate ratio of the algorithm in terms of the fraction
of the value of the optimal solution guaranteed. The second and third columns list the time required
to obtain the stated approximation ratio for the deterministic and randomized algorithms respectively.
Approximation Deterministic Randomized
ratio alg. runtime alg. runtime
2/3 O (
√
n2.83n) O (
√
n2.587n)
3/5 N/A O (
√
n2.382n)
1/2 O (
√
n2.59n) O (
√
n2.09n)
1/3 O (
√
n2.22n) O (n2n)
1/4 O (n2n) O (2n)
Lemma 3.7 is used to determine the runtime of the various approximation algorithms. The proof of Lemma 3.7 can be
found in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.7. Let r be a ﬁxed integer, then
( n
n/r
)= O ( rn√
n(r−1) (r−1)nr
).
The new randomized approximation algorithms can be presented given the provided lemmas. Table 1 presents a sum-
mary of the approximate ratios and running times obtainable by the new randomized algorithms.
Theorem 3.8. A 23 approximate coalition structure in ν can be found in O (
√
n2.587n) time.
Proof. A 23 approximation can be obtained as follows: First construct ν 25
in O (
√
n2.587n) time, then run Algorithm 3.1 to
ﬁnd two disjoint coalitions that maximize the sum of their values. Finally run Algorithm 3.2 for 3
4n
5 = O (2.41n) iterations.
This procedure guarantees a 23 approximate solution with high probability.
Let C S∗ be an optimal coalition structure in ν 2
5
with the least number of coalitions. By Theorem 2.3, |C S∗|  4. We
consider two cases.
1. |C S∗| 3. Algorithm 3.1 returns a 23 approximate solution in O (2n) time.
2. |C S∗| = 4. Let the coalitions in C S∗ be |C1| |C2| |C3| |C4|. Since ν 2
5
is 2n5 superadditive, |C3|+|C4| > 2n5 . Otherwise
{C1,C2,C3 ∪ C4} is an optimal coalition structure with fewer coalitions. Since |C3|  |C4|, it must be the case that
|C3| > n5 . Therefore, |C1|, |C2| > n5 .
At least one of the following must be true:
(a) ν(C1) + ν(C2) 23ν(C S∗),
(b) ν(C1) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) 23ν(C S∗) or
(c) ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) 23ν(C S∗).
Since, if all three inequalities were false, summing the right- and left-hand sides yields:
2
(
ν(C1) + ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4)
)
< 2 ∗ ν(C S∗).
However, this is a contradiction as ν(C1) + ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) = ν(C S∗).
If ν(C1) + ν(C2)  23ν(C S∗), then Algorithm 3.1 returns a 23 approximate solution in O (2n) time. If one of the second
or third cases is true, then both |C1| + |C3| + |C4| and |C2| + |C3| + |C4| contain fewer than 4n5 coalitions. Therefore, by
Lemma 3.2, Algorithm 3.2 returns a 23 approximate solution in O (3
4n
5 ) = O (2.41n) iterations.
The bottleneck step is constructing ν 2
5
, which requires O (
√
n2.587n) time. 
Theorem 3.9. A 35 approximate coalition structure in ν can be found in O (
√
n2.38n) time.
Proof. First construct ν 1
3
in O (
√
n2.38n) time. After constructing ν 1
3
, run Algorithm 3.1 followed by Algorithm 3.2 for
3
3n
4 = O (2.28n) iterations.
Let C S∗ be an optimal coalition structure in ν 1
3
with the least number of coalitions. By Theorem 2.3, |C S∗|  5. There
are three cases to consider.
1. |C S∗| 3. Algorithm 3.1 will return a 2 > 3 approximate solution in O (2n) time.3 5
T. Service, J. Adams / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 2061–2074 20692. |C S∗| = 4. If ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) < 35ν(C S∗), then ν(C1) > 25ν(C S∗). Let Ci be the coalition in {C2,C3,C4} with the
highest value. Since ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) = ν(C S∗) − ν(C1), then ν(Ci) 13 (ν(C S∗) − ν(C1)). Therefore,
ν(Ci) + ν(C1) ν(C S
∗)
3
+ 2
3
ν(C1)
ν(C S∗)
3
+ 4
15
ν
(
C S∗
)= 9
15
ν
(
C S∗
)= 3
5
ν
(
C S∗
)
.
Hence, either ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) 35ν(C S∗) or ν(C1) + ν(Ci) 35ν(C S∗). If ν(C2) + ν(C3) + ν(C4) 35ν(C S∗), then
Algorithm 3.2 returns a 35 approximate solution in O (3
3n
4 ) = O (2.28n) time because |C1| n4 . If ν(C1)+ν(Ci) 35ν(C S∗)
then Algorithm 3.1 returns a 35 approximate solution.
3. |C S∗| = 5. Since ν is n3 superadditive, any three coalitions Ci , C j and Ck can contain at most 2n3 agents. Since the
three highest valued coalitions in C S∗ must be a 35 approximate solution, then Algorithm 3.2 returns a
3
5 approximate
solution in O (3
2n
3 ) = O (2.09n) iterations. 
Theorem 3.10. A 12 approximate coalition structure in ν can be found in O (
√
n2.09n) expected time.
Proof. Construct ν 1
4
in O (
√
n2.09n) time, then run Algorithm 3.1 to identify two disjoint coalitions that maximize the
sum of their values, followed by Algorithm 3.2 for 3
5n
8 = O (1.99n) iterations. Finally, run Algorithm 3.3 for 2 4n7 = O (1.49n)
iterations with upperbound = n6 . By Lemma 3.5, each iteration of Algorithm 3.3 requires O
( 1
2
n
6
( n
n/6
))
time. Hence, the total
runtime of Algorithm 3.3 is O
( 2 4n7
2
n
6
( n
n/6
))= O (2.08n).
We show that this procedure guarantees a 12 approximate solution with high probability.
Let C S∗ be an optimal coalition structure in ν 1
4
with the least number of coalitions. By Theorem 2.3, |C S∗| 7.
Let |C1| |C2| · · · |Cr | be the coalitions in C S∗ . Note that |Cr−1| + |Cr | > n4 otherwise, since ν 14 is
n
4 superadditive,
{C1, . . . ,Cr−2,Cr−1 ∪ Cr} is an optimal coalition structure with fewer coalitions. Since |Cr−1| |Cr |, it must be that |Cr−1|
n
8 . Hence, for all i < r, |Ci | n8 .
There are four cases to be considered.
1. |C S∗| 4. Algorithm 3.1 returns a 12 approximate solution in O (2n) time.
2. |C S∗| = 5. One of {C1,C2} and {C3,C4,C5} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)2 . If ν(C1) + ν(C2) ν(C S
∗)
2 , then Algo-
rithm 3.1 returns a 12 approximation solution. Note that |C1| + |C2| 2n5 (as they are the two largest of the 5 coalitions
in C S∗) and |C3| + |C4| + |C5| 3n5 . Therefore, if ν(C3) + ν(C4) + ν(C5) ν(C S
∗)
2 , then Algorithm 3.2 returns a solution
with value at least ν(C3) + ν(C4) + ν(C5) ν(C S∗)2 with high probability in O (3
3n
5 ) = O (1.94n) iterations.
3. |C S∗| = 6. One of {C1,C5,C6} and {C2,C3,C4} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)2 . If {C1,C5,C6} has total value at
least ν(C S
∗)
2 , then |C1| + |C5| + |C6|  58 because |C2|, |C3|, |C4|  n8 . Likewise, if {C2,C3,C4} has total value at least
ν(C S∗)
2 , then |C2| + |C3| + |C4| 58 because |C5| + |C6| n4 and |C1| n8 . Therefore, in either case, Algorithm 3.2 returns
a solution with value at least ν(C S
∗)
2 .
4. |C S∗| = 7. One of {C1,C2,C3} and {C4,C5,C6,C7} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)2 . Since |C4| + |C5| + |C6| + |C7|
1
2 then |C1| + |C2| + |C3|  12 . Therefore, if {C1,C2,C3} has value at least ν(C S
∗)
2 , then Algorithm 3.2 will return a
1
2 approximate solution in O (3
n
2 ) = O (1.74n) iterations. Otherwise, if {C4,C5,C6,C7} has value at least ν(C S∗)2 , then
Algorithm 3.3 will return a 12 approximate solution in 2
4n
7 iterations because |C7| |C6| 16 . 
Theorem 3.11. A 13 approximate coalition structure in ν can be found in O (n2
n) time.
Proof. First construct ν 2
9
in O (n2n) time. Run Algorithm 3.1 to identify two disjoint coalitions that maximize the sum of
their values, followed by Algorithm 3.2 for 3
5n
12 = O (1.59n) iterations.
We show that this procedure guarantees a 13 approximate solution with high probability.
Let C S∗ be an optimal coalition structure in ν 2
9
with the least number of coalitions. By Theorem 2.3, |C S∗|  8. There
are three cases to consider.
1. |C S∗| 6. Algorithm 3.1 returns a 13 approximate solution in O (2n) time.
2. |C S∗| = 7. One of {C1,C2}, {C3,C4}, and {C5,C6,C7} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)3 . If {C1,C2} or {C3,C4} has
total value at least ν(C S
∗)
3 , then Algorithm 3.1 returns a
1
3 approximation solution. Otherwise, Algorithm 3.2 returns a
1
3
approximation solution in O (3
3n
7 ) = O (1.61n) iterations.
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at least ν(C S
∗)
3 , then Algorithm 3.1 will return a
1
3 approximate solution. Notice that |C1| + |C2|  2n8 = n4 and ν 29
is 2n9 superadditive, |C7| + |C8| > 2n9 . Therefore, |C6| + |C7| + |C8|  n3 . Thus, n − n4 − n3 = 5n12  |C3| + |C4| + |C5| 
|C6 + |C7| + |C8|. Therefore, if either {C3,C4,C5} or {C6,C7,C8} has total value at least ν(C S∗)3 , then Algorithm 3.2 will
ﬁnd a 13 approximation in O (3
5n
12 ) = O (1.59n) iterations. 
The presented 14 approximation algorithm runs in O (2
n) time. Since requiring ν k
r
to be monotonic requires O (n2n) time,
it is not possible to use monotonicity to simplify the 14 approximation algorithm. Algorithm 3.4 presents a randomized algo-
rithm to extract two disjoint coalitions that maximize the sum of their values in games that are not necessarily monotonic
and forms the basis of the 14 approximation algorithm.
Algorithm 3.4 works similarly to Algorithm 3.3. Each agent is placed into one of two sets S1 or S2 with equal probability.
For each of S1 and S2 the highest valued coalition containing at most upperbound agents is determined. Each iteration of
this process yields two disjoint coalitions C ′1 and C ′2. The two coalitions with the highest total value are returned. The
analysis of the running time and correctness of Algorithm 3.4 is analogous to that of Algorithm 3.3. Hence, each iteration
of Algorithm 3.4 requires O
( 1
2u
( n
u
))
time for an upperbound of u. Therefore if C1 and C2 are two disjoint coalitions each
containing fewer than upperbound agents, then after 2|C1|+|C2| iterations Algorithm 3.4 ﬁnds an approximate solution with
value at least ν(C1) + ν(C2) with probability e−1e .
Algorithm 3.4 Extracting two coalitions from a not necessarily monotonic ν . Requires two parameters: num_iterations and
upperbound.
1: Ci ← ∅ for i = 1,2
2: for i = 0 to num_iterations do
3: C ′i ← ∅ for i = 1,2
4: for k = 0 to num_agents do
5: Add agent ak to one of S1 and S2 with equal probability
6: end for
7: for C ⊂ S1, |C | upperbound do
8: if ν(C) > ν(C ′1) then
9: C ′1 ← C
10: end if
11: end for
12: for C ⊂ S2, |C | upperbound do
13: if ν(C) > ν(C ′2) then
14: C ′2 ← C
15: end if
16: end for
17: if ν(C ′1) + ν(C ′2) > ν(C1) + ν(C2) then
18: Ci ← C ′i for i = 1,2
19: end if
20: end for
Theorem 3.12. A 14 approximate coalition structure in ν can be found in O (2
n) expected time.
Proof. First, construct ν 2
9
in O (2n) time. Note that in this situation ν 2
9
is not necessarily monotonic. Once ν 2
9
is constructed,
identify the coalition C ⊆ N that has the highest value (this can be done in a single O (2n) time loop through all coalitions).
Finally, run Algorithm 3.4 twice. First for 2
4n
9 = O (1.36n) iterations with an upperbound of 2n9 , for a total running time of
O (1.96n). Second for 2
2n
5 = O (1.32n) iterations with an upperbound of n4 , for a total running time of O (1.95n).
Let C S∗ be an optimal coalition structure in ν 1
4
with the fewest number of coalitions. By Theorem 2.3, |C S∗| 8. Assume,
without loss of generality that for Ci,C j ∈ C S∗ , |Ci | |C j | whenever i < j. There are ﬁve cases to consider.
1. |C S∗| 4. The highest valued coalition is a 14 approximate solution and is found in O (2n) time.
2. |C S∗| = 5. One of C1, C2, C3 and {C4,C5} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)4 . Since |C4|+|C5| 2n5 and |C5| |C4| n4
after 2
2n
5 iterations, Algorithm 3.4 will ﬁnd a 14 approximate solution.
3. |C S∗| = 6. One of C1, C2, {C3,C4} and {C5,C6} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)4 . Since any two coalitions Ci and C j
must collectively contain at least 2n9 agents and |C1| + |C2| n3 , both |C3| + |C6| and |C4| + |C5| are bounded above by
n − 2n9 − n3 = 4n9 . Note that,
3 · |C3| |C1| + |C2| + |C3| = n− |C4| − |C5| − |C6| n − n = 2n ,
3 3
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The average utilities generated by the randomized and deterministic algorithms for ﬁve different approximation ratios on three problem distributions.
Approximation 2/3 3/5 1/2 1/3 1/4
ratio
Normal Randomized 32.497 32.401 32.466 32.371 28.568
Deterministic 32.575 N/A 32.497 32.375 32.371
Modiﬁed Randomized 617.14 610.1 529.71 432.585 316.59
Uniform Deterministic 619.51 N/A 503.595 405.79 385.415
NDCS Randomized 62.246 61.5042 57.466 49.087 36.772
Deterministic 63.163 N/A 52.648 48.788 48.072
where the last inequality follows from the fact that |C5|+ |C6| 2n9 . Therefore, |C3| 2n9 . Hence, Algorithm 3.4 will ﬁnd
a 14 approximate solution after 2
4n
9 iterations.
4. |C S∗| = 7. One of C1, {C2,C3}, {C4,C5} and {C6,C7} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)4 . Again, since any two coalitions
Ci and C j must collectively contain at least
2n
9 agents and |C1|  n7 , then |C2| + |C7|, |C3| + |C6| and |C4| + |C5| are
bounded above by n − 4n9 − n7 = 26n63 . Notice that,
2 · |C2| |C1| + |C2| = n − |C3| − |C4| − |C5| − |C6| − |C7| n − 5n
9
= 4n
9
.
As before, the last inequality follows from the fact that ν 2
9
is 2n9 -superadditive. Therefore, |C2| 2n9 and Algorithm 3.4
will ﬁnd a 14 approximate solution after 2
26n
63 iterations.
5. |C S∗| = 8. One of {C1,C8}, {C2,C7}, {C3,C6} and {C4,C5} must have total value at least ν(C S∗)4 . Again, since any two
coalitions Ci and C j must collectively contain at least
2n
9 agents, then |C1| + |C8|, |C2| + |C7|, |C3| + |C6| and |C4| + |C5|
are bounded above by n − 6n9 = n3 . The coalitions other than C1 must contain at least 7n9 agents, since ν 29 is
2n
9 -
superadditive. Therefore, C1 can contain at most 2n9 agents. Therefore, Algorithm 3.4 will ﬁnd a
1
4 approximate solution
after 2
n
3 iterations. 
4. Empirical study
This section presents an empirical comparison of the randomized approximation algorithms to their deterministic coun-
terparts. The empirical results are presented in two subsections. The ﬁrst compares the randomized and deterministic
algorithms in terms of the solution utilities they generate. The second subsection compares the runtimes of the randomized
and deterministic algorithms over a number of problem sizes. All data points are averaged over 20 independent runs. For
each run, the randomized algorithms were run for three iterations to guarantee that the stated approximation ratio was
found with probability 1− (1− e−1e )3 > 0.95.
4.1. Utility comparison
All experiments presented in this subsection consists of problems with 24 agents. The performance of the randomized
and deterministic algorithms are compared over the following three problem distributions, which are standard to the coali-
tion structure generation literature [1,9,10,12]:
1. Normal Distribution: the value of each coalition C was set to |C | ·N (1.0,0.01).
2. Modiﬁed Uniform Distribution: each coalition C is assigned a value drawn uniformly between 0 and 10 · |C |; however,
each coalition’s value is increased by a random number drawn uniformly between 0 and 50 with 20% probability.
3. Normally Distributed Coalition Structures (NDCS): the value of each coalition C is drawn from a normal distribution
with mean |C | and standard deviation √|C |.
Table 2 provides the average utility of the solutions generated by both the deterministic and the randomized algorithms.
Recall that no deterministic 35 approximation algorithm exists. In general, the average utility of solutions generated by the
randomized algorithm was slightly less than that of the deterministic algorithm. This is a result of the randomized algorithm
being probabilistic. When averaged over 20 independent runs, it is likely during at least one run that the algorithm will fail
to ﬁnd a solution as good as the deterministic algorithm’s solution.
It is interesting to note that during some of the runs the randomized algorithm performed better than the deterministic
algorithm. For example, the average performance of the randomized 13 approximation algorithm was slightly higher then
the average performance of the deterministic 13 approximation for the Modiﬁed Uniform problem distribution. This is to be
expected though as the following example illustrates. Consider the 23 approximation algorithms. Assume that the optimal
coalition structure consists of three equally sized, and equally valued, coalitions, C1,C2 and C3. Further assume that all
2072 T. Service, J. Adams / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 2061–2074Fig. 1. Comparison of the runtimes of the deterministic and randomized algorithms for each approximation guarantee on a variety of problem sizes.
Runtimes are plotted on a logarithmic scale.
other coalitions have value 0. The deterministic 23 approximation algorithm will simply return an approximate coalition
structure consisting of two of these coalitions, say C1 and C2. However, it is possible that the randomized 23 approximation
algorithm will return a coalition structure consisting of C1, C2 and C3, thus returning a solution with value strictly greater
than that returned by the deterministic algorithm. While this example is artiﬁcial, it illustrates one type of situation where
the randomized algorithms can outperform their deterministic counterparts (i.e., situations where the randomized algorithm
has some probability of returning an optimal solution while the deterministic algorithm is unable too).
4.2. Runtime comparison
This subsection presents a comparison of the runtimes of the deterministic and the randomized algorithms. Fig. 1
presents a comparison of the runtimes of both the randomized and deterministic algorithms for all performance guar-
antees on problems ranging from 20 to 27 agents. As the run time of both the randomized and deterministic algorithms
does not depend on the problem instance (i.e., the particular coalition utilities) the reported running times are for only the
modiﬁed uniform distribution.
T. Service, J. Adams / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 2061–2074 2073As can be seen in Fig. 1, in most cases the runtime of the randomized algorithms was lower than that of their determin-
istic counterparts. The exception is the 14 approximation algorithms in which the randomized and deterministic algorithms
performed roughly equivalently in terms of runtime (however, the randomized algorithm was slightly faster on average for
most problem sizes).
The following average speedups were achieved by the randomized algorithms compared to their deterministic counter-
parts.
1. The 14 randomized algorithm ran in 89.6% of the time as its deterministic counterpart.
2. The 13 randomized algorithm ran in 42.7% of the time as its deterministic counterpart.
3. The 12 randomized algorithm ran in 22.4% of the time as its deterministic counterpart.
4. The 23 randomized algorithm ran in 50.8% of the time as its deterministic counterpart.
The empirically determined runtime of the randomized algorithms scaled more quickly than the theoretical runtime
analysis provided in Section 3. This is believed to be a result of terms hidden in the O (·) notation. With larger numbers of
agents, the empirical runtime should match the theoretical bounds.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents simple randomized algorithms for generating coalition structures, along with quality guarantees, for
arbitrary and monotonic coalitional games. The presented algorithms generate the same approximation ratios in less time
than all previous approximation algorithms. The algorithms build on prior work and follow from a careful analysis of the
number of coalitions, and their sizes, in particular coalition structures. The probability that any given randomized algorithm
generates a solution within the stated approximate ratio can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by rerunning the algorithm
a small number of times. For example, 3 runs guarantee that the stated approximation ratio is achieved with probability
greater than 95%.
One of the presented randomized algorithms can obtain a 23 approximate in O (
√
n2.587n) time, improving upon the
previous approximation algorithm that required O (2.83n) time to generate a 23 approximate solution. Also the new tech-
niques allow a 14 approximate solution to be generated in the optimal time of O (2
n) (i.e., in order to make any guarantees
on solution quality the values of all 2n − 1 coalitions must be observed at least once). This result improves on the previous
best approximation ratio obtainable in O (2n) time of 18 .
This manuscript also shows how to employ randomization to generate performance guarantees that current deterministic
approaches are unable to generate. The presented randomized algorithms are the ﬁrst algorithms capable of guaranteeing
an approximation ratio of 35 in arbitrary characteristic function games.
A limitation of the techniques presented in this manuscript is that the desired approximation ratio must be chosen a
priori and then the appropriate algorithm run. Thus, the present work stands in contrast to previous coalition structure gen-
eration work where a single anytime algorithm is presented and generates successively better solution quality guarantees.
As this paper has demonstrated, the anytime property can be sacriﬁced for better solution quality guarantees in less time
when the necessary approximation ratio is known ahead of time. However, the requirement of selecting an approximation
ratio a priori is common to approximation algorithms for many combinatorial problems.
Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 3.1. In a binomial distribution with success probability p, after  1p  trials the probability of at least one success is at least e−1e
(approximately, 63.21%).
Proof. Since the probability that any single trial is unsuccessful is 1− p, the probability that n trials are all unsuccessful is
(1− p)n . Hence, the probability of at least one successful trial in n trials is 1− (1− p)n .
Consider the case were n =  1p , then
(1− p)n =
(
1− 1
n
)n
.
Since (1− 1n )n increases monotonically to 1e as n → ∞, (1− 1n )n  1e . Hence, 1− (1− p)
1
p  e−1e . 
Lemma 3.4. The following identity holds for all positive integers n > u:
n∑
k=u
(
n
k
)(
k
u
)
= 2n−u
(
n
u
)
.
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)
xk , by the binomial theorem. Differentiating f (x) u times yields:
f (u)(x) = n · (n− 1) · · · · · (n − u + 1)(x+ 1)n−u+1
=
n∑
k=u
(
n
k
)
k · (k − 1) · · · · · (k − u + 1)xk−u+1,
which can be rewritten as:
f (u)(x) = n!
(n− u)! (x+ 1)
n−u
=
n∑
k=u
(
n
k
)
k!
(k − u)! x
k−u.
Finally, dividing both sides by u! and setting x= 1 yields the desired identity. 
Lemma 3.7. Let r be a ﬁxed integer, then
( n
n/r
)= O ( rn√
n(r−1) (r−1)nr
).
Proof. Recall that Stirling’s approximation states:
n! = √2πn
(
n
e
)n(
1+ o(1))= 
(√
n
(
n
e
)n)
,
(
n
n/r
)
= n!
n
r ! (r−1)nr !
= O (1) ·
( √
n(ne )
n√
n
r (
( nr )
e )
n
r ·
√
n− nr (
(n− nr )
e )
(n− nr )
)
= O (1) ·
(
nn√
n(nr )
n
r · (n − nr )(n−
n
r )
)
= O
(
rn
√
n(r − 1) (r−1)nr
)
. 
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